

# Kvm\_open

Be very careful with privilege mode of calling process

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## Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

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<b>Attack Category</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Privilege Exploitation</li></ul>	
<b>Vulnerability Category</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Privilege escalation problem</li><li>• Indeterminate File/Path</li><li>• TOCTOU - Time of Check, Time of Use</li></ul>	
<b>Software Context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Memory Management</li></ul>	
<b>Location</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• kvm.h</li></ul>	
<b>Description</b>	<p>When <code>kvm_open()</code> or <code>kvm_openfiles()</code> are used in a privileged program, care must be taken to ensure that no inappropriate access is granted to a user.</p> <p>The functions <code>kvm_open()</code> and <code>kvm_openfiles()</code> return a descriptor used to access kernel virtual memory via the <code>kvm</code> library routines. Both active kernels and crash dumps are accessible through this interface.</p> <p>The information provided by the <code>kvm</code> library routines is potentially of use to hackers trying to craft an attack against the examined code. It is therefore important that, if the process is running in a privileged mode (e.g., <code>suid-root</code>), care be taken to ensure that users are not given access to kernels to which they should not have access.</p> <p>The opened kernel or crash dump is specified by its file path. This means that in some cases, these functions may be vulnerable to path related attacks.</p>	
<b>APIs</b>	<b>Function Name</b>	<b>Comments</b>
	<code>kvm_open</code>	
	<code>kvm_openfiles</code>	
<b>Method of Attack</b>	<p>If an attacker can run an <code>suid-root</code> program that examines kernel virtual memory and gain access to this information, then the attacker may gain information useful in exploiting other vulnerabilities.</p> <p>The key issue with respect to TOCTOU vulnerabilities is that programs make assumptions</p>	

1. <http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi-rules/35-BSI.html> (Barnum, Sean)

<p>about atomicity of actions. It is assumed that checking the state or identity of a targeted resource followed by an action on that resource is all one action. In reality, there is a period of time between the check and the use that allows either an attacker to intentionally or another interleaved process or thread to unintentionally change the state of the targeted resource and yield unexpected and undesired results.</p> <p>Even if the program invoking <code>kvm_open()</code> first does a check to ensure that permissions are appropriate, the attacker may be able to exploit a race condition to substitute a different kernel for examination before <code>kvm_open()</code> is called.</p>			
<b>Exception Criteria</b>			
<b>Solutions</b>	<b>Solution Applicability</b>	<b>Solution Description</b>	<b>Solution Efficacy</b>
	Whenever <code>kvm_open()</code> or <code>kvm_openfiles()</code> is used.	If program is running in a privileged mode such as <code>suid-root</code> , before calling <code>kvm_open()</code> the effective user and group IDs should be set to reflect the actual user, to ensure that no inappropriate access is granted.	Typically effective.
	Generally applicable.	The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the	Does not resolve the underlying vulnerability but limits the false sense of security given by the check.

	false sense of security given by the check.	
	Generally applicable.	Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
		Does not eliminate the underlying vulnerability but can help make it more difficult to exploit.
	Generally applicable.	Limit the spread of time (cycles) between the check and use of a resource.
		Does not eliminate the underlying vulnerability but can help make it more difficult to exploit.
	Generally applicable.	Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
		Effective in some cases.
<b>Signature Details</b>	kvm_t * kvm_open(const char *execfile, const char *corefile, char *swapfile, int flags, const char *errstr);  kvm_t * kvm_openfiles(const char *execfile, const char *corefile, char *swapfile, int flags, char *errbuf);	
<b>Examples of Incorrect Code</b>	<pre>// running as suid-root kvm_t *handle = kvm_open(execfile, corefile, swapfile, flags, errstr);  // then expose results of kernel virtual memory examination</pre>	
<b>Examples of Corrected Code</b>	<pre>// running as suid-root // change effective user and group IDs to reduce privileges  kvm_t *handle = kvm_open(execfile, corefile, swapfile, flags, errstr);  // expose results of kernel virtual memory examination only as strictly necessary</pre>	

<b>Source References</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">ITS4 Source Code Vulnerability Scanning Tool</a><sup>2</sup></li> <li>• <a href="http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=60&amp;a=6">http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=60&amp;a=6</a></li> <li>• <a href="http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/vulnerabilities/scriv/ucd-ecs-95-09.pdf">http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/projects/vulnerabilities/scriv/ucd-ecs-95-09.pdf</a><sup>4</sup></li> </ul>	
<b>Recommended Resource</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <a href="#">man page for kvm_open(), kvm_openfiles()</a><sup>5</sup></li> </ul>	
<b>Discriminant Set</b>	<b>Operating System</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNIX</li> </ul>
	<b>Languages</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• C</li> <li>• C++</li> </ul>

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